LEGAL
Indiana Court Revives Gay Teacher’s Lawsuit
Social studies and language teacher takes on Indianapolis Archdiocese
BY ARTHUR S. LEONARD
On November 23 a unanimous
three-judge panel
of the Court of Appeals
of Indiana reversed a
trial court’s decision to dismiss a
lawsuit by Joshua Payne-Elliott
against the Roman Catholic Archdiocese
of Indianapolis. Payne-
Elliott was fi red in June 2019 by
Cathedral High School, where he
had worked as a social studies and
language teacher since 2006, after
the Archdiocese threatened to
terminate Cathedral High’s recognition
as a “Catholic school” if it
continued to employ Payne-Elliott,
who married his same-sex partner
in 2017. The Roman Catholic
Church has generally taken the
position that it is privilege to discharge
any employees who enter
into same-sex marriages.
The Archdiocese made the same
threat against Brebeuf Jesuit Preparatory
School, where Payne-
Elliott’s husband, Layton, is a
teacher. The Jesuits, unlike the
Brothers of Holy Cross, who operate
Cathedral High, have refused
to fi re Payne-Elliott’s husband,
and reportedly the Archdiocese is
moving to suspend Brebeuf’s recognition
as a “Catholic school.”
Payne-Elliott sued the Archdiocese
on July 10, 2019 for interfering
with his contractual and employment
relationship with Cathedral
High School. The Archdiocese fi led
a motion to dismiss the lawsuit
on August 21, 2019, arguing that
its action was protected by the
First Amendment, which it claims
prohibits courts from interfering
with “internal church matters.”
The fi rst judge assigned to hear
the case, Stephen Heimann, denied
the Archdiocese’s motion on May 1,
2020, writing: “Without further discovery
and with all reasonable inferences
in Payne-Elliott’s favor, it is possible
that Payne-Elliott could prove
that at the time of his termination,
the Archdiocese was not justifi ed in
taking the action it had taken and
could have reversed those actions.”
When a defendant responds to
a lawsuit by fi ling a motion to dismiss,
Joshua Payne-Elliott (right) and his husband Layton.
the trial court is to reject the
motion unless the plaintiff’s complaint
fails to allege facts suffi cient
to support a legal claim against the
defendant. Consistent with rules
governing motions to dismiss,
Judge Heimann did not take into
account any evidentiary materials
submitted by the Archdiocese, focusing
solely on the allegations in
Payne-Elliott’s complaint.
The Archdiocese then fi led an
answer to the complaint and a motion
for reconsideration of Judge
Heimann’s refusal to grant the
motion to dismiss, which Judge
Heimann essentially ignored. The
judge rejected a subsequent motion
asking him to certify an appeal of
his refusal to dismiss the case,
insisting that “evidence needs to
be garnered through discovery”
in order to determine whether the
Archdiocese’s actions were constitutionally
protected. The Archdiocese
then appealed directly to the
Indiana Supreme Court, asking
it to dismiss the case or remove
Judge Heimann from presiding.
The Supreme Court granted an
“emergency writ” staying discovery,
and Judge Heimann then recused
himself from the case after holding
a hearing on the recusal motion.
The Archdiocese’s litigation tactics
apparently sought to avoid at
all costs having its decision-makers
subjected to being examined under
oath by Payne-Elliott’s lawyers,
and its attitude throughout has
been that it is free to do whatever
FACEBOOK/JOSHUA PAYNE-ELLIOTT
it wants, regardless of civil law, as
long as its motivation is religious.
The Indiana Supreme Court appointed
a new trial judge, Lance
Hamner, with a direction for him
to rule anew on the Archdiocese’s
motion to dismiss. Judge Hamner
then granted the motion, stating
that the court lacked jurisdiction
over this legal claim against the
Archdiocese, and that the complaint
should be dismissed “for
failure to state a claim upon which
relief can be granted.” Payne-Elliott
appealed, and the Court of Appeals
panel unanimously reversed Judge
Hamner’s ruling on November 23,
bringing the case back to life.
Writing for the Court of Appeals,
Judge Elizabeth Tavitas found that
the trial court clearly has jurisdiction
to try this case. Furthermore,
rejecting a motion to dismiss is
not to discount the Archdiocese’s
First Amendment arguments, but
merely to correctly classify them as
defenses, which are generally not relevant
in deciding a motion to dismiss
a case on jurisdictional grounds.
However, the Archdiocese’s arguments
would be relevant to a motion
for summary judgment. Judge
Tavitas pointed out that by taking
account of the Archdiocese’s
First Amendment defense in deciding
the motion to dismiss, Judge
Hamner erred by not treating the
motion as a motion for summary
judgment. In deciding a motion for
summary judgment, a court is supposed
to determine whether there
are material factual disputes that
need to be resolved before it can
issue a ruling on the merits of the
case. And, customarily summary
judgment does not take place until
the parties have had an opportunity
to conduct discovery concerning
the facts, which Payne-Elliott was
never allowed to do in this case.
In other words, Judge Heimann’s
original decision rejecting the Archdiocese’s
motion to dismiss the case
was correct on all counts. And focusing
in on the First Amendment
question, factual discover would be
necessary to determine whether the
“ministerial exception” recognized
by the US Supreme Court applies to
his position. Although the Supreme
Court has broadly defi ned this
“exception” from compliance with
civil law regarding religious school
teachers who could be deemed to
be “ministers” due to their religious
functions, the question of whether a
high school teacher of purely secular
subjects with no religious duties
can be swept into the “exception”
solely on the Church’s theory that
all religious school teachers are role
models for Catholic living who must
comply in every particular with
Catholic doctrine, including opposition
to marriage equality, has yet to
be decided by the Supreme Court.
Furthermore, ruled the Court
of Appeals, Judge Hamner had
wrongfully dismissed this case
“with prejudice,” which means
Payne-Elliott would not be allowed
to fi le an amended complaint. This
was erroneous, ruled the Court of
Appeals, because Indiana’s court
rules allow a plaintiff whose initial
complaint is dismissed a right to
fi le an amended complaint within
10 days after receiving the court’s
notice that it dismissed the case.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed
Judge Hamner’s ruling in
all respects and sent the case back
to the trial court. A November 23
news report about the ruling in the
Indianapolis Star did not indicate
whether the case will go back to
Judge Hamner, or whether a different
judge will be appointed to
➤ FIRED TEACHER, continued on p.11
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